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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 58 MAY 1960 No. 7 
STOCKHOLDER VOTES MOTIVATED BY ADVERSE 
INTEREST: 
THE ATTACK AND THE DEFENSEt 
Earl Sneed* 
I N the exercise of their limited powers of management, stock-holders elect directors; vote for or against charter amendments, 
sales, mergers, dissolution; and, occasionally, vote on employee 
benefits, such as pension plans and stock options. In theory, stock-
holders will vote in a manner beneficial to the corporate whole. 
All are co-owners and supposedly there is a unity of financial in-
terest. Realistically, in most voting situations there is no unity 
of interest.1 When two or more classes of shares exist, the interests 
of one class may squarely oppose the interests of the other.2 Even 
in a one-class corporation, the majority may advantage itself at the 
expense of the minority. Because of differing pecuniary drives 
there are votes cast in adverse interest-votes-motivated by a quest 
for personal and peculiar gain at the expense of other stockholders. 
While the law of corporations retains the basic concept of majority 
rule, there are equitable limitations upon the power of the ma-
jority.8 Consequently, the actions of the voters in control are 
always subject to challenge at the suit of the minority. 
It is the purpose of this article to study stockholder votes mo-
tivated by adverse interest from the standpoint of the attack and the 
defense. First, the remedies available to the complaining minority 
are examined. Then follows a study of the indicia of adverse in-
tSubmitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the 
Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. 
• Dean, College of Law, The University of Oklahoma.-Ed. 
1 "The prevalent philosophy is still that of a body in which substantial identity of 
interest between all parties concerned necessarily exists. This, it is evident, is becoming 
each day more out of accord with the facts." RIPLEY, MAIN STREEr AND WALL STREEr 75 
(1927). 
2 "In an honestly conducted corporation the interests of all shareholders will for the 
most part coincide, unless there are different classes of shareholders." TAYLOR, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 5th ed., 774 (1902). See RIPLEY, MAIN SntEET AND 
WALL STREEr 127 (1927). 
3 LATIIN, CoRP0RATIONS 513 (1959). 
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terest in specific shareholder actions. Knowledge of the nature 
and import of these indicia should enable the careful lawyer to 
avoid or defeat the charge that unconscionable adverse interest 
vitiated the result of a stockholder vote. 
I. THE ATTACK: THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE 
The stockholder disagreeing with his covoters on the ground 
that their actions are motivated by interests adverse to his welfare 
has an arsenal of weapons at his disposal. Assuming that the rem-
edy of appraisal is not the exclusive remedy in the particular ac-
tion,4 the equitable powers of the courts are his to use. Despite 
the fact that he is in the minority as to interest, and usually as to 
numbers, the dissident stockholder has certain procedural advan-
tages. 
One possible advantage is that in many situations involving 
stockholder votes, the presumption of fairness usually accorded the 
actions of the majority is negated because of the conflicting in-
terests of the dominant group. For example, when the majority 
stockholders cause their corporation to sell to them, the majority 
shareholders are on both sides of the bargain, and the burden 
of showing good faith is on the majority. In such a situation, there 
is no presumption of fairness.5 
Another advantage inherent in the plaintiff's position is that in 
litigating corporate actions involving stockholder voting, the plain-
tiff is asserting frequently a direct and personal right and is not 
bringing a derivative suit for and on behalf of the corporation.6 
Thus, a plaintiff attacking a recapitalization plan requiring a 
charter amendment may bring a direct action;7 so may a dissident 
stockholder objecting to a merger or consolidation on the ground 
4 Occasionally appraisal will be the exclusive remedy. The cases are collected in 162 
A.L.R. 1237, 1250 (1946). See also STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 591-597 (1949). 
5 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 at 306 (1939); Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining 
Co., (6th Cir. 1915) 221 F. 529; Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., (W.D. Mich. 1883) 17 F. 48; 
Klopot v. Northrop, 131 Conn. 14, 37 A. (2d) 700 (1944). 
6 The line between the individual or direct personal right of action and the share-
holders' derivative action on behalf of the corporation is difficult to draw. LATTIN, CoRPo-
RATIONs 346 (1959). 
7 In such a situation, the corporation has no direct interest. It is a contest between 
classes of stockholders. Lehrman v. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 207 Misc. 314, 138 N.Y.S. (2d) 
163 (1955). But see Christie v. Fifth Madison Corp., 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 492 (1953), in which 
a suit involving a recapitalization plan was held to be derivative. The cases are distinguish-
able because in Christie, the plaintiff alleged that the plan would erect a debt structure 
that would destroy the corporation whereas in Lehrman, there was no allegation of harm 
to the corporation. See also Keller v. Wilson & Co., 22 Del. Ch. 175, 194 A. 45 (1937). 
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of personal loss and not damage to the corporation.8 By a direct 
suit, the plaintiff may force a dissolution,9 recover for damage 
suffered in a freeze-out,10 or secure the appointment of a receiver 
on the ground of fraud and mismanagement.11 
The right to bring a direct rather than a derivative action is 
often an advantage because some jurisdictions have erected formid-
able barriers in the path of those who would bring derivative 
actions. New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and 
California provide for the posting of security for expenses by the 
plaintiffs in some or all derivative actions.12 Plaintiffs in direct 
actions do not have the same burden because the suit· is not "in 
the right of the corporation. "13 Plaintiffs bringing derivative 
actions in federal courts must satisfy federal rule 23 (b) by showing 
that there was ownership of shares at the time of the wrong, that 
there was no collusive effort to confer jurisdiction on the federal 
courts, and that there was an attempt to secure relief within the 
corporation or that such would be futile.14 But federal rule 23 (b) 
does not apply to direct actions,15 nor do similar provisions adopted 
by some of the states.16 So while plaintiffs in direct actions usually 
must pay their own attorney's fees17 and cannot seek payment 
s General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., (6th Cir. 1918) 250 F. 160, affd. 260 U.S. 
261 (1922); Sobel v. Whittier Corp., (E.D. Mich. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 643. 
9Fontheim v. Walker, 141 N.Y.S. (2d) 62 (1955); Davidson v. Rabinowitz, 140 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 875 (1951). See Hornstein, "A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power To 
Wind up a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder," 40 CoL. L. REv. 220 at 
242-243 (1940). 
10 E.g., Southern Pacific v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 at 487 (1919). 
11 Rugger v. Mt. Hood Elec. Co., 143 Ore. 193, 20 P. (2d) 412 (1933). 
12 For a summary of the various types of security legislation, see note, 52 CoL. L. REv. 
267 (1952). 
13 Ames v. Voit, (S.D. N.Y. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 89 at 92, revd. on other grounds sub 
nom. Ames v. Mengel, (2d Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 344; Lazar v. Knolls Co-op. Section No. 
2, Inc., 205 Misc. 748, 130 N.Y.S. (2d) 407 (1954); Davidson v. Rabinowitz, 140 N.Y.S. (2d) 
875 at 876 (1951). 
14 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (b). 
15 Sobel v. Whittier Corp., (E.D. Mich. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 643. Neither state nor 
federal laws require a stockholder to seek remedy within the corporation before bringing 
a direct suit. 13 FLETCHER, Cvc. CoRP., perm. ed., §5932 (1943). A stockholder bringing 
a direct action is not required to have owned stock at the time of the action in question. 
Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F. (2d) 36 (1947). 
16 E.g., Delaware Chancery Rule 23 (b) provides that in an action to enforce a second-
ary right, plaintiff must aver that he was stockholder at the time of the transaction and 
that he must set forth his efforts to secure from directors or stockholders the action he 
desires. But rule 23 (b) does not apply to direct actions. Elster v. American Airlines, 34 
Del. Ch. 94 at 98, 100 A. (2d) 219 (1953). 
17 Alexander v. Atlanta & W.P.R. Co., 113 Ga. 193, 38 S.E. 772 (1901); Joyce v. Cong-
don, 114 Wash. 239, 195 P. 29 (1921). Cf. Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., (E.D. 
Pa. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 945; Hitchcock v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Eq. 576, 107 
A. 267 (1919). See Hornstein, "The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits," 39 COL. 
L. REv. 784 at 800 (1939). 
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of the fees by the corporation as can plaintiffs in successful de-
rivative suits, there are fewer procedural obstacles in direct suits. 
In sum, the stockholder who challenges corporate action be-
cause of selfish interests of those in control normally will have some 
strategic advantages. In most instances, the burden of showing 
fairness will be on the defendants and frequently the shareholder's 
suit will be a direct, and not a derivative action. 
A. Preventing the Transaction: The Prohibitory Injunction 
The stockholder, aggrieved by the threatened action of the 
group in control, may seek a prohibitory injunction. This is an 
effective weapon in a complex, fast-moving, corporate controversy 
because it stops or prevents the threatened action and preserves 
the status quo.18 Obviously it is much easier to secure justice 
through prevention than through the undoing of that which has 
been done. 
The injunctive powers of equity are available when majority 
action is induced by fraud19 or when such action is unjustly op-
pressive20 or when it is violative of the charter provisions pertain-
ing to the powers of the corporation.21 On the whole, equity is 
reluctant to meddle with corporate management, and disputes 
over policies of business and economics are beyond interference, 
even though the course charted is unwise and unprofitable. 22 In 
deciding whether to grant or withhold relief, the court will "bal-
ance the equities." It will look at the comparative injuries to be 
sustained, and if the decree would do more harm than good, the 
injunction will be denied.23 Therefore, if stopping a majority-
approved plan of recapitalization will force the corporation into 
liquidation, thereby causing great loss to all shareholders, the 
plaintiff will be denied relief. The possible benefit to the plaintiff 
is outweighed by the loss to the noncomplaining stockholders.24 
18 Rohrlich, "Suits in Equity by Minority Stockholders as a Means of Corporate Con-
trol," 81 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 692 at 723 (1933). 
19 See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); 
White v. Kincaid, 149 N.C. 303, 63 S.E. 109 (1908). 
20 Outwater v. Public Serv. Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 A. 729 (1928). 
21 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 at 453-454 (1881). 
2213 FLETCHER, Cvc. CORP., penn. ed., §5821 (1943). 
23 Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 S. 516 (1927); General Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 88 N.J. Eq. 237, 102 A. 252 (1917J. 
24 Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. (2d) 11, 85 P. (2d) 580 (1938). 
In some instances, the court may "balance the equities" by denying the injunction and 
granting the plaintiff money for his shares. Paterson v. Shattuck. Arizona Copper Co., 186 
Minn. 611, 244 N.W. 281 (1932); Ontjes v. Bagley, 217 Iowa 1200, 250 N.W. 17 (1933). 
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The injunction may be preliminary or permanent.25 The 
former is provisional and may be granted prior to a full hearing 
on the merits. Its purpose is to preserve the status quo until such 
time as a permanent injunction or other relief is granted or de-
nied. 26 If the plaintiff can show that he will be saved irreparable 
loss, and that relatively little harm will be caused the opposition, 
an order halting any change in existing rights may be obtained.27 
In some instances, bonds are required to insure that no financial 
detriment will befall the majority or the corporation because of 
the stoppage of the contemplated action.28 If the bond is not forth-
coming, the preliminary will be refused, and the corporation may 
proceed with its planned action.29 
The issuance or denial of the preliminary marks the outcome 
of a battle but does not end the war.30 The plaintiff may be de-
nied the injunction pendente lite yet gain the ultimate victory.31 
Or he may secure the preliminary and lose the final decision.32 
In any event, the dissatisfied shareholder is usually well advised 
to seek the preliminary injunction. If he does not, the court 
when making a definitive ruling may use that omission as an in-
dication that the plaintiff was not, in fact, opposed to the chal-
lenged move.33 It seems that he who would oppose stockholder 
action should be diligent in pursuing the remedy encompassed 
in the preliminary injunction. 
Diligence is important; so is timing. The decisions indicate 
that it is advantageous from the plaintiff's viewpoint to seek the 
injunction before, and not after, the stockholder vote on the ques-
tion. Embattled stockholders who have waited until after the vote 
and have then sought to restrain dividend payments or other ac-
tions taken pursuant to the vote have been singularly unsuccess-
25 The "permanent" injunction may be limited as to time. In Boyd v. New York 8: 
H. R. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1915) 220 F. 174, New York Central was enjoined from seeking consoli-
dation with the Harlem Railroad during the time of a lease Harlem had granted Central. 
26 In addition, there may be a temporary restraining order, which is issued upon an 
application for an injunction and preserves the status quo until the propriety of granting 
a preliminary injunction can be determined. 
27 MacArthur v. Port of Havana Docks Co., (D.C. Me. 1917) 247 F. 984. 
28 Allied Chem. 8: Dye Corp. v. Steel 8: Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. I, 120 A. 486 (1923). 
29 Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., (3d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 701. 
30 Buckley v. Cuban Am. Sugar Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 322, 19 A. (2d) 820 (1940) (plan of 
recapitalization halted until final hearing). 
31 In Sander v. Janssen Dairy Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 512, the preliminary 
restraint of a recapitalization plan was denied, but subsequently, in Kamena v. Janssen 
Dairy Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A. (2d) 200 (1943), affd. 134 N.J. Eq. 359, 35 A. (2d) 
894 (1944), the plan was permanently enjoined. 
32 E.g., Cole v. National Cash Credit Assn., 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931). 
33 See, e.g., Ostlind v. Ostlind Valve, Inc., 178 Ore. 161, 165 P. (2d) 779 (1946). 
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ful.34 Undoubtedly the intrinsic merits of the plaintiff's cause 
are far more important than the timing of his opening attack, 
but it is apparent that any investor opposed to a management-
sponsored proposal would be wise to begin legal action prior to 
the meeting. If he wins on the merits, he obviates the necessity and 
expense of the meeting. If he loses, he saves himself and the cor-
poration money, time, and effort. Further, bringing serious op-
position into the open by seeking an injunction may cause man-
agement to abandon the proposal.35 
Sometimes when the plaintiff asks for an injunction prior to the 
meeting, the court will let the vote be cast with the understanding 
that if the vote is favorable, implementation of the plan will be 
stayed pending a final hearing.36 This procedure satisfies the 
argument of management that the issue will be moot if the stock-
holders disapprove.37 In most instances, the suggestion that the 
stockholders might vote down the proposal is cruelly illusory. 
Before submitting the proposal, management will have the votes 
in hand, or the votes will be safely predictable because of the proxy 
system. Be that as it may, some courts insist that the voters express 
their will before the matter is adjudicated. 
While there is always the outside chance that the voters will 
veto the matter, they usually approve. It is plainly evident that 
stockholder approval prior to a hearing on the merits of plaintiff's 
plea for an injunction works to the disadvantage of the plaintiff. 
Consciously, and perhaps unconsciously, a vote in favor of the 
proposal influences courts.38 Probably this is so because we live 
in democratic society, and basic in our training is the belief in the 
wisdom of the majority. 
34E.g., Johnson v. Fuller, (3d Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 618; Ainsworth v. Southwestern 
Drug Corp., (5th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 172; Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. 
App. (2d) 11, 85 P. (2d) 580 (1938); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 
11 A. (2d) 331 (1940); Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 
(1923); Shaw v. Davis, 78 Md. 308, 28 A. 619 (1894); Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 Ill. 
364, 29 N.E. (2d) 502 (1940); Faunce v. Boost Co., 15 N.J. Super. 534, 83 A. (2d) 649 (1951). 
35 E.g., Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., (6th Cir. 1915) 221 F. 529 (proposal 
abandoned before vote). Cf. Wick v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 46 Ohio App. 253, 
188 N.E. 514 (1932) (injunction unsuccessfully sought before vote on sale of assets; plan 
abandoned after vote). 
36 E.g. Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A. (2d) 200 (1943), affd. 
134 N.J. Eq. 359, 35 A. (2d) 894 (1944). 
37 MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., (D.C. Del. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 462; Grausman 
v. Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co., 95 N.J. Eq. 223, 122 A. 815 (1923). 
SB See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal App. (2d) 11, 85 P. (2d) 580 
(1938) (90% acceptance of recapitalization plan rebutted plaintiff's plea for equitable 
relief); Outwater v. Public Serv. Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 A. 729 (1928) (determination 
of fairness is influenced by a heavy vote of approval). 
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The injunction has been used in an effort to block every type 
of corporate action requiring stockholder voting. Usually the at-
tack has been made on the proposal as such and not on the right of 
individual stockholder-voters to cast their votes. When the plain-
. tiff attempts to keep certain stockholders from voting, his cause 
is based on the plea that the challenged stockholders will vote in 
response to motives adverse to the good of the corporate whole.39 
But equity is reluctant to inquire into motive, for the determina-
tion of motivation is a most difficult task.40 It is easier to let the 
challenged stockholders vote, and if the result is oppressively in-
jurious to the complainants, then the proper move is to enjoin 
the consummation of the plan.41 While it is true that there have 
been some instances in which specific shareholders have been kept 
from voting,42 the disfranchisement of specific shareholders by 
enjoining them from voting is a rare and unusual remedy. 
The injunction is a trenchant and precious weapon available 
to the plaintiff objecting to unfair action threatened or taken by 
the majority. He who uses it with intelligence and with skill in 
timing and phrasing can upset the best laid plans of a greedy 
majority. There is no "doubt as to the general principle that 
equity will restrain arbitrary and capricious acts on the part of 
majority shareholders or directors if such acts violate the rights 
of minority stockholders."48 
B. Undoing the Transaction: Rescission 
The usual course of action of the stockholder who believes 
that he will be hurt by the announced program of the majority 
is to ask for an injunction. He may fail to win the injunction and 
still seek rescission of the majority action. Or a stockholder may 
not become aware of the extent of the oppression, the nature of 
the fraud, or the fact of illegality, until after the vote.44 Or a 
39 E.g., Windmuller v. Standard Distilling&: Distrib. Co., (C.C. N.J. 1902) II4 F. 491. 
40 Bjorngaard v. Goodhue County Bank, 49 Minn. 483, 52 N.W. 48 (1892). 
41 South &: North Alabama R. Co. v. Gray, 160 Ala. 497, 49 S. 347 (1909). 
42 See, e.g., Hyams v. Calumet &: Hecla Mining Co., (6th Cir. 1915) 221 F. 529 (use 
of votes to create interlocking directorates enjoined); Memphis &: Charleston R. Co. v. 
Woods, 88 Ala. 630, 7 S. 108 (1889) (question of monopoly); Macht v. Merchants Mortgage 
&: Credit Co., 22 Del. Ch. 74, 194 A. 19 (1937) (votes purchased). 
43 Mitchell Inv. Co. v. Republic Steel Corp., (N.D. Ohio 1944) 63 F. Supp. 323 at 328, 
affd. (6th Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 105. 
44 In Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land &: Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 P. 1044 (1928), 
plaintiffs, two widows and a minor, did not comprehend the nature of their rights until 
after the sale, which was voided. In Cole v. Wells, 224 Mass. 504, 113 N.E. 189 (1916), the 
plaintiff voted against a sale, asked for appraisal, then discovered fraud and waste and 
sought to set aside sale. Held, appraisal not exclusive. 
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stockholder may postpone legal action until after the election in 
the hope that the stockholders will disapprove.45 In any of these 
instances, when the plaintiff seeks to undo what has been done, 
the remedy sought is redressive - it is an effort to cure past dere-
lictions on the part of the majority. 
Sometimes the plaintiff will seek to avoid the transaction 
because of some fatal weakness on the part of the holder cast-
ing a decisive vote. For example, he may attack on the ground 
that the holder's vote was saturated with adverse interest, and his 
motive was antithetical to the good of the corporation.46 This 
tactic seldom wins because, as previously mentioned, courts are 
reluctant to disfranchise because of motive. So, instead of attack-
ing the vote of specific holders, the usual move is to seek rescission 
on the plea that the action was unauthorized,47 or was procured 
by fraud,48 or constituted an abuse of power.4!) 
In asking for rescission the plaintiff must act promptly. If 
he waits too long, the rights of the innocent will intervene and 
make it difficult and unjust to undo that which has been done. 
When new rights have been created in the interim between 
the challenged action and the plea for rescission, equity may 
void part of the challenged action and permit the rest to stand.50 
Or dissident shareholders may recognize the intervention of the 
claims of others and seek only an accounting and payment for the 
value of their interests.51 Frequently the complaining stockholder 
will seek the alternative of rescission or payment of the value of 
the shares.52 For example, in May v. Midwest Refining Co.,53 
Standard Oil of Indiana had acquired all but a few shares of 
Midwest Refining. Then the assets of Midwest were sold to 
45 See Eagleson v. Pacific Timber Co., (D.C. Del. 1920) 270 F. 1008. 
46 E.g., Norton v. Union Traction Co., 183 Ind. 666, llO N.E. ll3 (1915). 
47E.g., Brown v. McLanahan, (4th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 703 (amendment changing 
voting voided because unauthorized by voting trust agreement). 
48E.g., Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W. (2d) 341 (1949) (merger 
approved in face of allegation of fraud). 
49 E.g., Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 197, 56 A. 254 (1903) (by-law 
fixing excessive salary voided because it constituted abuse of power by majority holder). 
60 E.g., Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (1923) (recap-
italization plan held valid except portion wiping out preferred accruals). 
51 Asking for an accounting only without a request for rescission signifies ratification 
of the transaction. See Heimbauch v. Hitchcock, ll5 Kan. 182, 222 P. ll4 (1924). In 
Soderstrom v. Kungsholm Baking Co., (7th Cir. 1951} 189 F. (2d) 1008, the profits to which 
the minority were entitled were traced to the ultimate corporation which held them as 
trustee ex maleficio. 
52 E.g., Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 P. 1044 (1928); 
Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545, 102 S.E. 249 (1920). Cf. Tanner v. 
Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155 (1904). 
53 (1st Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 431, cert. den 314 U.S. 668 (1941). 
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Standard. The plaintiff shareholder in Midwest claimed breach 
of trust and asked, inter alia, for rescission. The court considered 
the power of an equity court to withhold rescission, even though 
a case for such relief is made out. Dra·wing upon the analogy of 
the balancing of the equities doctrine in specific performance,54 
the court decided that equity may decline to grant rescission when 
such relief would create an inequitable result. Therefore, the 
trial court was upheld in its conclusion that the time and expense 
involved in "unscrambling an eighty million dollar egg" consist-
ing of vast and diversified properties would be so great that to 
order such would amount to a denial of justice. In lieu of rescis-
sion, the plaintiff was granted the amount he would have received 
had all of his prayers, other than rescission, been granted. 55 
The outcome of Midwest illustrates the broad range of rem-
edies available to the court of equity when the plaintiff-shareholder 
asks for rescission. If rescission would work undue hardship, if 
there would be imbalance of the equities, rescission will be denied. 
This does not mean, however, that the stockholder with the meri-
torious cause will go without relief. The court may rescind the 
transaction in whole,56 it may order an accounting,57 it may direct 
the payment of the value of the plaintiff's interests,58 or it may 
decree a combination of the several alternatives. 
C. Compelling a Distribution of Assets 
In the rescission cases, equity sometimes orders a money pay-
ment on the ground that conditions have changed and rescission 
would be unjust to those who have acquired subsequent rights.59 
Compensation in money may be obtained in other ways by dis-
54 Id. at 438. 
55 The payment was suggested by Standard. In a novel answer, Standard stated that 
it had acquired all but sixty-two shares of Midwest, fifty held by plaintiff, the remainder 
by one seeking appraisal. The expense of preparing a defense was so great that Standard 
would, without admitting liability, pay plaintiff his portion of the recovery under all of his 
prayers, except rescission and accounting, plus attorney's fees and costs. The trial and 
appellate courts approved this as an equitable solution. 
56 E.g., Brown v. McLanahan, (4th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 703 (charter amendment 
nullified). 
57E.g., Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., (W.D. Mich. 1883) 17 F. 48 (lease rescinded, 
receivers appointed, and accounting ordered). 
58 In May v. Midwest Ref. Co., note 53 supra, direct payment to the plaintiff was 
ordered even though he brought a derivative suit. The court held that plaintiff was acting 
for the corporation and for himself, and since no other stockholders and no creditors were 
involved, direct payment was proper. There may be situations in which direct recoveries 
are permitted in derivative suits. For a good discussion of the problem, see Keenan v. 
Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A. (2d) 904 (1938). 
59 E.g., Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., (8th Cir. 1906) 144 F. 765. 
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senting shareholders who are victims of unfair, illegal, or fraudu-
lent majority actions. In some instances, courts have permitted 
direct suits by minority holders for the recovery of the loss of value 
of the shares. In other situations, courts have ordered liquidation. 
I. Direct Suits for Damages 
The effectiveness of the direct suit for damages suffered be-
cause of oppressive acts of the majority is illustrated in Lebold v. 
Inland Steel Co.60 Inland Steel, majority owner of Inland Steam-
ship, dissolved Steamship for the announced purpose of getting 
rid of the minority holders. The court had earlier refused to block 
the dissolution but left the door open for plaintiffs to seek relief if 
they were dealt with unfairly.61 After the dissolution, the minority 
sought a money judgment because of the damage suffered when 
the majority appropriated the business to itself in violation of its 
fiduciary duties. The court instructed the trial court to fix dam-
ages based upon the difference between the amount the plaintiffs 
received from the sale of the physical assets and the value of the 
shares as shares in a prosperous concern continuing in business.62 
In forthrightly confirming recovery of damages in a direct 
suit, the court of appeals did not quibble about, in fact did not 
even mention, the usual rule that a stockholder cannot recover 
damages personally for a wrong done to the corporation.63 Tech-
nically, the injury was to the plaintiff's company, Inland Steam-
ship, because Steamship did not receive full value for its assets. 
But the court, like other courts before it, followed an apparent 
exception to the general rule and permitted a direct suit on the 
theory that the value of the minority's interest in Steamship had 
been misappropriated by the majority. 
Other courts have sanctioned the direct suit on the same basis, 
namely, that individual property belonging to the plaintiff had 
been "converted" or "misappropriated" by the illegal, fraudulent, 
or oppressive action of the majority.64 This is, in fact, illogical 
60 (7th Cir. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 369, cert. den. 316 U.S. 675 (1942). 
61 Lebold v. Inland S.S. Co., (7th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 351. 
62 The plaintiffs had received $700 per share as liquidating dividends based on the 
sale of the physical assets. Ultimately, the plaintiffs received a total of $1,350 per share. 
Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., (7th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 876. 
63 "As a general rule, however, a shareholder is considered to have no direct, individ-
ual right of action for corporate wrongs which impair the value of his investment." 
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 333 (1946). 
64 Mills v. Tiffany's, Inc., 123 Conn. 631, 198 A. 185 (1938); Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 
180 Mo. I, 79 S.W. 155 (1904) (dictum); Equitable Trust Co. v. Columbia Nat. Bank, 145 
S.C. 91, 142 S.E. 811 (1928); Wunsch v. Consolidated Laundry Co., 116 Wash. 44, 198 P. 
383 (1921). 
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because the shareholder, as such, does not individually own any 
of the property which has been sold or transferred by his corpora-
tion. All such property belongs 'to the corporation. And at least 
one court has denied that a wrongful sale was conversion, on the 
ground that the plaintiff stockholder never had any legal title to 
any part of the corporate assets. However, the same court granted 
a direct recovery and used the theory that the purchasing company 
held the value of the plaintiff's interest in the selling company in 
trust for plaintiff's use and benefit.65 
Whatever legal theory may be used to justify the direct suit, 
the important fact is that courts have taken a realistic view of 
majority actions destructive of minority interests and have allowed 
direct recoveries. Further, there has been no difficulty in finding 
the purchaser66 or the successor corporation67 or the instigators of 
the illegal or fraudulent act68 liable to the complainant. 
The direct suit may not be available if there are creditors of 
the plaintiff's corporation. If the cause of action arises because 
of destruction or wastage of corporate assets, then the sum re-
covered should go directly to the corporation for the benefit of 
creditors. If there are no creditors, and if applicable statutes do 
not make appraisal an exclusive remedy, then the direct suit is 
an effective and convenient weapon in the hands of the aggrieved 
stockholder. 
2. Compulsory Liquidation 
The most complete and the most drastic remedy available to 
the dissident stockholder is the suit to compel a winding up and 
distribution of the remaining assets of a solvent corporation. In 
some states this may be accomplished under statutory authority; 
in others the plaintiff must rely upon the inherent powers of 
equity. 
English law permits the direct suit in cases of oppression and fraud. Section 210 of 
the English Companies Act of 1948 (II &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §210) provides that a shareholder 
of a company being operated in an oppressive manner may secure a court order requiring 
the company to purchase his shares. For a discussion of the first decision by the House 
of Lords on this provision, see notes, 72 HARV. L. R.Ev. 761 (1959); 21 MoD. L. R.Ev. 653 
(1958). 
65 Nave-McCord Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, (8th Cir. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 383 at 390. See 
also Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1886) 27 F. 625. 
66 Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., (7th Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 369; Equitable Trust Co. v. 
Columbia Nat. Bank, 145 S.C. 91, 142 S.E. 811 (1928). 
67Ervin v. Oregon Ry.&: Nav. Co., (5.D. N.Y. 1886) 27 F. 625; Wunsch v. Consolidated 
Laundry Co., 116 Wash. 44, 198 P. 383 (1921). 
68 Mills v. Tiffany's, Inc., 123 Conn. 631 at 643-644, 198 A. 185 (1938). Directors who 
bring about an illegal transfer are personally liable, and any person actively and knowingly 
participating is equally liable to the minority. 
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a. The Inherent Power of Equity To Wind Up. The in-
herent power of a court of equity to liquidate or wind up a solvent 
corporation at the request of a minority stockholder on the ground 
of mismanagement, fraud, or oppression by the majority is gen-
erally conceded today.69 In contrast, the inherent power of equity 
to order a de jure dissolution of corporation is still questioned by 
some authorities.70 "Winding up" means the selling of the prop-
erty, the payment of debts, and the distribution of the remainder 
to the shareholders. Corporate life remains in the empty shell. 
In dissolution, the same steps occur, but the end result is the 
termination of corporate existence. Some courts will sanction 
winding up, but will deny dissolution.71 The reason advanced is 
that technical dissolution can be accomplished only by a suit by 
the state or by vote of the stockholders.72 But since winding up 
effectively takes the assets from the corporation and distributes 
the net worth to the owners, the distinction between "winding up" 
and "dissolution" is more academic than practical. In fact, some 
courts refer to winding up as a de facto dissolution.73 
Liquidation is an extreme remedy, and courts are very reluctant 
to order it. The reasons must be most cogent and urgent. Liquida-
tion will not be granted merely to bail the dissident out of a bad 
business venture. Nor is the remedy available because of some dis-
agreement over business policy.74 Judicial opinion is practically 
unanimous that liquidation of solvent corporations should be the 
ultimate remedy, because it involves accentuation of economic 
waste through forced receivership.711 Since winding up is a last-
69 Bailey v. Proctor, (1st Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 78, cert. den. 331 U.S. 834 (1947) (equity 
has inherent power to liquidate corporation where fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of 
trust exists whether or not there is insolvency); Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. of W. 
Va. v. Piedmont Coal Co., (4th Cir. 1933} 64 F. (2d) 817, cert. den. 290 U.S. 675 (1933); 
Red Bud Realty Co. v. South, 153 Ark. 380, 241 S.W. 21 (1922); Bilby v. Morton, 119 Okla. 
15,247 P. 384 (1926); Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W. (2d) 848 (1955); Goodwin 
v. Milwaukee Lithographing Co., 171 Wis. 351, 177 N.W. 618 (1920). The parent case is 
Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892). 
70 E.g., "In the absence of authority, which is frequently found conferred by statute, a 
court of equity may not dissolve a corporation at the suit of .•. a shareholder .... But the 
power of equity courts to liquidate and wind up the affairs of a corporation at the suit of 
a shareholder is recognized." STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 956 (1949). 
71 See Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. of W. Va. v. Piedmont Coal Co., (4th Cir. 
1933) 64 F. (2d) 817 at 827, cert. den. 290 U.S. 675 (1933). 
72 STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 958 (1949). 
73 Nashville Packet Co. v. Neville, 144 Tenn. 698 at 703, 235 S.W. 64 (1921). 
74Stott Realty Co. v. Orloff, 262 Mich. 375,247 N.W. 698 (1933); Fontheim v. Walker, 
282 App. Div. 373, 122 N.Y.S. (2d) 642 (1953). 
75 Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385 at 398, 279 S.W. (2d) 848 (1955). See Bailey v. 
Proctor, (1st Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 78 at 82, cert. den. 331 U.S. 834 (1947); Mills Dev. Corp. 
v. Shipp & Head, Inc., 126 Fla. 490, 171 S. 533 (1936). 
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resort remedy,76 courts will seek less stringent alternatives before 
ordering liquidation, such as compulsory dividends,77 payment 
of damages,78 or reduction and distribution of capital.79 
Liquidation may be the only solution when the wrongs are 
continuous and systematic, and there is no real hope for future 
betterment. If so, the usual pattern is to appoint a receiver who is 
charged with responsibility for termination of the affairs of the 
corporation.80 The end result is the payment to the dissident of 
his portion of the net assets. 
While the cases involving liquidation at the suit of a minority 
holder are reasonably numerous, there appear to be none in which 
dissolution has been ordered because of oppressive or fraudulent 
action stemming from a stockholder vote. The usual factual 
situation in the reported cases involves wastage of corporate 
assets and plundering by the majority. Since depredations of this 
nature can and do result from stockholder votes in adverse interest, 
it is believed that, in the proper case, equity would order liquida-
tion because of undue exertion of selfish interest in the corporate 
voting. 
b. Statutory Dissolution at the Suit of the Minority. Some 
states have statutes authorizing minority stockholders to sue for 
involuntary dissolution.81 If the equity court has any qualms 
about its inherent power to order winding up, statutory authority 
will quiet those fears. However, the grounds set forth in the 
statute must fit the situation. In some instances, the statutory 
grounds for dissolution may be narrow.82 Other statutes grant the 
courts a wide range of discretion by stating that dissolution may be 
ordered for "sufficient cause,''83 if "it is beneficial to the interest of 
the shareholders,''84 or if "reasonably necessary for the protection 
of the rights of stockholders."85 Under the broad type of statute, 
76 See Hornstein, "A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power To Wind up a 
Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder," 40 CoL. L. REv. 221 at 236 (1940). 
77 Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W. (2d) 848 (1955). 
78 Stebbins v. Michigan Wheelbarrow & Truck Co., (6th Cir. 1914) 212 F. 19. 
79 Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525, 155 P. 665 (1916). 
80 See Henry v. Ide, 208 Ala. 33 at 41, 93 S. 860 (1922); Brent v. B. E. Brister Sawmill 
Co., 103 Miss. 876, 60 S. 1018 (1913); Goodwin v. Milwaukee Lithographing Co., 171 Wis. 
351, 177 N.W. 618 (1920). 
81 See comment, 41 MICH. L. REv. 714 at 721 (1943). 
82 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1955) §10-381 (failure to appoint agent; law violation; 
disposition of all property, etc.). 
83 E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. (1958) §33-115; W. Va. Code (1955) §3093. 
84 E.g., Okla. Stat. (1951) §1.195 (3); Wash. Rev. Code (1951) §23.01.540. 
85 E.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) §294.97. 
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it would seem that the dissident can base his plea on the ground 
of unfairness, fraud, or illegality. Then if he meets the statutory 
requisites, he may ask for dissolution.86 
D. Summary 
We have seen now that a dissident shareholder who is not 
limited to the right of appraisal and who wishes to attack a majority 
action may have certain tactical advantages. When the majority 
is on both sides of the bargain, there is no presumption of fairness 
in favor of the majority proposal. In many situations, the plain-
tiff may bring a direct suit thereby escaping the restrictions 
several states impose on those who would bring a derivative 
action. 
Whether or not the dissatisfied shareholder has procedural 
advantages, he does have a variety of possible remedies. He may 
seek a prohibitory injunction or he may wait and ask for rescis-
sion. Under certain circumstances, he may bring a direct suit for 
damages. In extreme cases, equity may order liquidation, either 
under its inherent power or under a statutory grant of authority. 
In sum, an aggrieved shareholder wishing to attack the ma-
jority vote on the grounds of undue exertion of adverse interest 
has potent weapons at his disposal. 
II. THE DEFENSE: AVOIDANCE OF INDICIA OF ADVERSE INTEREST 
We now turn to an examination of the indicia of adverse in-
terest as they appear in corporate activities requiring shareholder 
approval. 
The reported cases disclose that dissentient stockholders and 
courts seize upon the presence or absence of certain facts as being 
indicative of an unconscionable exertion of adverse interest. It 
is the purpose of this section to catalog these objective manifesta-
tions of selfish interest, and their opposites, in order that lawyers 
and corporate executives may avoid or neutralize the adverse 
indicia during the planning and presentation phases of manage-
ment proposals. 
In the consideration of corporate activities requiring stock-
holder votes, emphasis is on the end to be obtained, not the means. 
86 Some statutes specify that the plaintiffs must own a definite percentage of shares. 
E.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. (1957) §78.650 (10%). Sometimes the plaintiff must have owned his 
shares for a certain time. E.g., Cal. Corp. Code (Deering, 1953) §4650 (six months). 
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For example, there are various ways to rid the corporation of un-
wanted stockholders, e.g., merger, sale, amendment, and so on, 
but the end result is the same. 
A. Corporate Actions Resulting in Direct Personal Gain 
I. Purchase by Stockholders of Assets Sold by the Corporation 
At common law, unanimous consent of all stockholders was 
required before a prosperous corporation could sell all or a major 
portion of its assets.87 The impracticability of such a rule brought 
statutory changes providing that a majority or two-thirds may sell. 
When a specified majority has power to sell, or to dissolve with a 
sale following, those who own or control the necessary votes have 
opportunity to seek a direct, personal gain, for the general rule now 
is that the majority stockholder may purchase the assets of the 
selling corporation. 88 
There are three typical fact situations in which the holder may 
exert an adverse interest by voting approval of a sale to the voter. 
The first is to employ the statutory procedure of selling the assets 
by vote of the required number.89 The second procedure is similar. 
Those in control sell to themselves, then ratify the transaction by 
casting their own votes in favor.90 The third situation involves 
dissolution followed by a sale to the controlling stockholder.91 
Whatever the fact situation, majority and controlling shareholders 
are on both sides of the bargain and the burden is on them to 
prove the fairness of the sale. Such transactions are not neces-
sarily evil.92 To the contrary, the result is often fair to all con-
87 Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., IO Del. Ch. 371, 93 A. 380 (1915); Patterson v. 
Shattuck Arizona Copper Co., 186 Minn. 611, 244 N.W. 281 (1932); In re Clark's Will, 257 
N.Y. 132, 178 N.E. 766 (1931); Cardiff v. Johnson, 126 Wash. 454, 218 P. 269, 222 P. 902 
(1923). 
88 May v. Midwest Ref. Co., (1st Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 431, cert. den. 314 U.S. 668 
(1941). Cf. Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 261, 106 N.E. (2d) 848 (1952); Price 
v. Holcomb, 89 Iowa 123, 56 N.W. 407 (1893). Contra, Chicago Hansom Cab Co. v. Yerkes, 
141 III. 320, 30 N.E. 667 (1892). 
89 E.g., Johnson Hotel Lawrence Corp., 337 III. 345, 169 N.E. 240 (1929) (sale to 
majority approved). 
90 E.g., Ostlind v. OstHnd Valve, Inc., 178 Ore. 161, 165 P. (2d) 779 (1946) (sale of part 
of assets approved). 
91 The classic example is Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1886) 27 F. 625, 
in which majority voted to dissolve a prosperous company then purchased its assets for 
$2,300,000, assets the court found to be worth $5,500,000. The minority received additional 
compensation. 
92 In many instances, courts have sustained sales in which dominant stockholders are 
on both sides of the bargain. See, e.g., McDermott v. O'Neil Oil Co., 200 Wis. 423, 228 
N.W. 481 (1930). 
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cerned and it is only when the thrust of adverse interest becomes 
unconscionable that courts rise to protect the complaining stock-
holders. 
The most important indicator of fairness, and one mentioned 
in virtually all of the cases involving litigated purchases by dom-
inant stockholders, is adequacy of price. It would seem that any 
group with fiduciary responsibilities would know that they can-
not purchase with impunity assets worth $5,500,000 for $2,300,-
000,93 buy a building for $2,500 vis-a-vis a bona fide offer for 
$3,500,94 secure a lease for $22,500 against a well-secured bid of 
$30,000,95 or grant mining rights for a tenth of what others would 
pay.96 These would appear to be "easy" cases, yet they were con-
troverted to the point of decisions by appellate courts. The self-
dealers pressed the businessman's concept that when the legislature 
grants the power, there is unbridled freedom to use it. But the 
courts imposed the now well-recognized equitable limitations on 
the power of the majority. 
After the "easy" cases, the determination of an adequate price 
becomes more difficult. At first blush it would seem that a value 
set by an outside appraiser would be virtually final. However, 
an appraiser employed by the control group carries the same stigma 
as his employer. He is working both sides of the street by repre-
senting both buyer and seller. Courts view his findings with 
considerable cynicism, if not utter disregard.97 Undoubtedly, the 
most convincing way to arrive at an unchallengeable price is to 
offer the property for public sale. If no offer higher than that of 
the defending stockholder is received,- courts will usually sustain 
the transaction.98 Sometimes no one is interested except the in-
siders.99 If no competitive bids are requested, that fact works 
against affirmance.100 Whether value is fixed by an outside ap-
praiser, by negotiation, or by public offering, if the enterprise is 
93 Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1886) Z'l F. 625. 
94 Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank Bldg. Co., (8th Cir. 1908) 159 F. 391. 
95 Schmid v. Lancaster Ave. Theatre Co., 244 Pa. 373, 91 A. 363 (1914). 
96 Franklin v. Havalena Mining Co., 16 Ariz. 200, 141 P. 727 (1914). 
97 See, e.g., Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 261, 106 N.E. (2d) 848 (1952). 
98 See, e.g., Lane & Co. v. Maple Cotton Mills, (4th Cir. 1915) 226 F. 692; McDermott 
v. O'Neil Oil Co., 200 Wis. 423, 228 N.W. 481 (1930); Price v. Holcomb, 89 Iowa 123, 56 
N.W. 407 (1893). 
99 E.g., McDermott v. O'Neil Oil Co., 200 Wis. 423, 228 N.W. 481 (1930). 
100 Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 261, 106 N.E. (2d) 848 (1952). In Wheeler 
v. Abilene Nat. Bank Bldg. Co., (8th Cir. 1908) 159 F. 391, the court ordered the bid price 
tested by a public sale. 
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sold in toto, account must be taken of the worth of good will and 
going-concern value.101 
The objective fact of next importance is the economic condi-
tion of the selling corporation. When a company is heading toward 
financial disaster, salvage operations are in order. Expediency 
may justify a sale to fiduciaries that would be condemned if the 
corporation were completely solvent and hopeful. Courts are 
prone to approve sales to insiders made by entities in economic 
straits,102 and are understandably reluctant to bless sales to insiders 
of assets of prosperous concerns.103 
Courts pay heed to other circumstances. If the selling-purchas-
ing group is open and aboveboard, with no secrets, such is in their 
favor.104 The absence of any appearance of an attempt to freeze 
out the minority and carry on the business in another form is a 
positive factor.105 The presence or absence of a statute permitting 
a dissenter to ask for an appraisal and purchase of his shares seems 
to make little difference. This is because appraisal is generally 
not an exclusive remedy when fraud is charged.106 Consequently, 
the availability of appraisal will not block a suit based on un-
conscionable selling of assets. And sometimes the buyer-seller 
may win because it is uneconomic and absurd to untangle that 
which has already been accomplished. So the courts order an addi-
tional payment to the complainants and the transaction stands.107 
In sum, if the dominant group wants to complete an unassail-
able purchase of assets from the corporation it controls, then that 
group must do everything possible to build a record free from the 
101 Operating businesses should have a value above and beyond the countable assets. 
See Ervin v. Oregon Ry. &: Nav. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1886) 27 F. 625. Cf. May v. Midwest Ref. 
Co., (1st Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 431, cert. den. 314 U.S. 668 (1941). 
102 E.g., Lane &: Co. v. Maple Cotton Mills, (4th Cir. 1915) 226 F. 692; Johnson v. 
Hotel Lawrence Corp., 337 Ill. 345, 169 N.E. 240 (1929); Price v. Holcomb, 89 Iowa 123, 
56 N.W. 407 (1893); Merriman v. National Zinc Corp., 82 N.J. Eq. 493, 89 A. 764 (1914). 
But see Chicago Hansom Cab Co. v. Yerkes, 141 Ill. 320, 30 N.E. 667 (1892), in which 
corporation was failing, yet sale to insider was voided. 
103Ervin v. Oregon Ry.&: Nav. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1886) 27 F. 625. 
104 McDermott v. O'Neil Oil Co., 200 Wis. 423, 228 N.W. 481 (1930). Cf. Weisbecker 
v. Hosiery Patents, Inc., 356 Pa. 244, 51 A. (2d) 811 (1947). 
105 Stebbins v. Michigan Wheelbarrow &: Truck Co., (6th Cir. 1914) 212 F. 19 (minor-
ity not permitted in successor corporation and awarded additional money); Lane &: Co. v. 
Maple Cotton Mills, (4th Cir. 1915) 226 F. 692 (minority invited to participate; sale 
approved). 
106 May v. Midwest Ref. Co., (1st Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 431, cert. den. 314 U.S. 668 
(1941); Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 261, 106 N.E. (2d) 848 (1952); Cole v. 
Wells, 224 Mass. 504, 113 N.E. 189 (1916). 
WT May v. Midwest Ref. Co., (1st Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 431, cert. den. 314 U.S. 668 
(1941). 
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indicia of adverse interest. The ideal record would be a purchase 
made at or subsequent to a public offering, an offering generated 
by sound business reasons and made after full disclosure of all 
pertinent facts. Anything less may result in a finding of violation 
of fiduciary obligations. 
2. Sales of Property by the Stockholder to the Corporation 
Similar in result to the purchase of assets owned by the cor-
poration, but different in procedure, is the sale of personally-
owned property to the corporation. When all or substantially all 
of the assets are sold, statutes normally provide that the stock-
holders must approve either the sale or the dissolution prior to 
the sale. In contrast, when property is purchased, the stockholders 
rarely vote on the matter. This is because of the basic rule that 
the directors manage the company, and, as managers, the directors, 
not the stockholders, do the buying. But sometimes, because of 
the conflicting interests, directors will submit the question of pur-
chase for prior approval or subsequent ratification by the stock-
holders. When this happens, the stockholders have opportunity 
to vote on a purchase by the corporation from influential, and 
probably dominant, stockholders. 
When the price is fair and the property is needed, it is probable 
that the court will hold that the selling shareholder can vote to 
ratify the purchase from himself.108 Frankness and the absence of 
secret profits are validating factors.109 The economic condition 
of the entity is important. A failing enterprise may need diversifi-
cation, and a purchase from a shareholder, which will provide the 
profit potential, stands an excellent chance of approval.110 
The decisions involving votes on purchases by the corporation 
from stockholders make it evident that it is proper and legal for a 
stockholder to vote his stock for the purchase of property in which 
he has an interest. However, approval by a majority is not always 
enough. If the purchase is to withstand challenge by a militant and 
dissatisfied minority, the consideration must be reasonable, the 
property needed, and the transaction free from secret profits and 
unconscionable motives. 
10s Bjomgaard v. Goodhue County Bank, 49 Minn. 483, 52 N.W. 48 (1892); Gamble 
v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890). 
109 See Hellier v. Baush Mach. Tool Co., (1st Cir. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 705 at 708. 
ll0ibid. 
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3. Executive Compensation -Salaries, Bonuses, and 
Stock Options 
979 
Normally directors fix executive compensation, and stock-
holders have no vote on the matter. But more and more are 
stockholders being called upon to approve or ratify bonus or 
stock-option plans. While ratification usually creates a strong 
presumption of validity, ratification in and of itself does not 
render the plan inviolate. There can be no wastage of corporate 
assets through exorbitant salaries and benefits.111 But ratification 
is the most effective means of avoiding the stigma of adverse 
interest in a compensation proposal. 
In the leading case of Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp.,112 
a stock-option plan had been approved by the stockholders of a 
Delaware corporation. When the plaintiff challenged the validity 
of the plan, the defendant-directors, who were beneficiaries under 
the proposals, contended that shareholder ratification settled the 
matter. The Supreme Court of Delaware admitted that this was 
an appealing argument: 
"Ratification by stockholders, indeed, is frequently decisive 
of controversies in this field of law. . . . But unless ratifica-
tion is unanimous, it can never constitute the only requisite 
to validity. An unconscionable deal between directors per-
sonally and the corporation they represent could not become 
conscionable merely because most of the stockholders were 
either indifferent or actually in sympathy with the directors' 
scheme. Certainly gifts to themselves or to their business as-
sociates will not avail against the vote of any qualified 
objector.''113 
The words in Gottlieb about the effect of ratification puzzled 
litigants and lawyers. On petition for reargument,114 the court 
clarified its previous statements by saying that where the directors 
vote themselves stock options and do not obtain ratification, the 
burden is on the directors to prove their utmost good faith. When 
there is ratification, the burden of proof is shifted to the objector, 
who must convince the court that no one of ordinarily sound 
111 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 at 591 (1933). 
112 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A. (2d) 660 (1952). 
113 Id. at 90-91. 
114 Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 177, 91 A. (2d) 57 (1952). On petition 
for reargument, the defendant directors said that the original option (note 112 supra) had de-
stroyed all practical distinctions between cases where directors grant stock options to them-
selves without stockholder ratification and cases where ratification is obtained. Id. at 178. 
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business judgment would view the consideration furnished by the 
individual directors as being a fair exchange for the options.115 
In Gottlieb, the court carefully emphasized that the benefici-
aries of the plan did not control the stockholders. Therefore, 
ratification by the stockholders placed the burden on the objector 
to prove that the plan was beyond the realm of good business judg-
ment, that is, that the plan constituted waste, and that reasonable 
men, fully informed and acting in good faith, would not differ 
on that position.116 
This view gives a great advantage to management in publicly-
held corporations. The propensity of stockholders to follow the 
lead of management and send in their proxies in favor of manage-
ment proposals is a well-known and well-documented phenomenon 
in modern corporations.117 So even though management does not 
directly own-or control a voting majority, ratification of compensa-
tion plans is easy to obtain, and ratification places a tough obstacle 
in the path of a dissenter.118 
When directors do control the winning vote, the conflicting 
interests of the controlling stockholders nullify the effect of the 
ratification, and the directors still have the burden of proving the 
inherent fairness of the compensation, be it salary, bonus, or stock 
option. The control group can sustain their action by proving the 
adequacy of the amount and kind of consideration given for the 
compensation and the openness and honesty of their disclosures to 
the noncontrolling shareholders.119 
115 33 Del. Ch. at 178-179, 91 A. (2d) 58; accord, Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. 
Super. 431, 92 A. (2d) 862 (1952), affd. mem. 12 N.J. 467, 97 A. (2d) 437 (1953). Cf. Kerbs 
v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A. (2d) 652 (1952) (ratification cures 
voidable action of directors). 
116 33 Del. Ch. 177 at 181, 91 A. (2d) 57 (1952). On decision following reargument, 
the court remanded the cause for trial to give plaintiff opportunity to prove that the 
values of the options granted and services to be rendered by the officers as consideration 
therefor were so disproportionate that reasonable men would not differ in their condem• 
nation of the bargain as unfair. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 283, 92 A. 
(2d) 594 (1952). 
117 See, e.g., BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 139 
(1932); LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 13-48 (1958); Dodd, "The Modem Cor• 
poration, Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation," 54 HARv. L. REv. 917 at 919-920 
(1941). 
118 Subsequent to Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A. (2d) 660 
(1952), Del. Gen. Corp. Laws §157 was amended (July 8, 1953) to require a showing of 
actual fraud in order to void the judgment of the directors as to the value of rights of 
stock options so authorized. 
110 The principles of Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A. (2d) 
652 (1952), and Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 177, 91 A. (2d) 57 (1952) are 
summarized in Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A. (2d) 786 (1952). One of the 
principles is that "absent independent stockholder ratification, interested directors have 
the burden of showing that the consideration to be received constitutes a fair exchange 
for the options." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 220-221. 
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B. Corporate Actions Resulting in Personal Gain 
Through Increase in Share Values 
I. Elimination of Accrued Dividends 
981 
When a corporation emerges from a business recession, and 
profits replace deficits, pressures build up for the renewal of divi-
dends. If the corporation has preferred shares with cumulative 
dividends, the owners of preferred want the accumulated divi-
dends.120 The holders of common shares press management to do 
something about the preferred accruals, accruals which must be 
paid before dividends can be resumed on the common. In result, 
any management desirous of staying in office must seek ways and 
means of eliminating the accruals.121 
The importance of this problem in the years following the 
great depression of the thirties is reflected in the many law review 
articles in which eminent and thorough scholars examined the 
legal, financial, and policy aspects of accruals.122 It is not the intent 
here to replow that ground. Instead, the problem will be examined 
from the aspect of the indicia of adverse interest which were mani-
fested when stockholders were presented with a plan of recapitaliza-
tion, the ultimate intent of which was the elimination of 
accruals.123 
120 See, e.g., Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., (3d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 701. Or-
ganized in 1925, the transit system paid dividends in diminishing amounts from 1926 to 
1931; then stopped dividends, but war conditions caused a sudden and tremendous increase 
in earnings. The preferred stockholders agitated for the payment of dividends. Id. at 704. 
121 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Jones &: Laughlin Steel Corp., (W.D. Pa. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 
432. "During the last half of 1936, and the first half of 1937, business began to improve; 
and the Company was faced with the problem of paying off or refunding the dividend 
arrears." Id. at 435-436. 
122 Some of the representative articles are Becht, "Alterations of Accrued Dividends," 
49 MICH. L. REv. 363, 565 (1951); Dodd, "Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporations -
From Vested Right to Mirage," 57 HARV. L. REv. 894 (1944); Dodd, "Fair and Equitable 
Recapitalizations," 55 HARV. L. REv. 780 (1942); Lattin, "A Primer on Fundamental Cor-
porate Changes," I WEST. REs. L. REv. 3 (1949); Latty, "Fairness -The Focal Point in Pre-
ferred Stock Arrearage Elimination," 29 VA. L. REv. I (1942); Meck, "Accrued Dividends 
on Cumulative Preferred Stocks: The Legal Doctrine,'' 55 HARV. L. REv. 71 (1941). 
The problem of accruals is a diminishing one. There are few recent cases-probably 
because prosperity has enabled corporations to pay or refund. Accruals on preferred 
shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange decreased by $717,074,169 or nearly 82% 
from 1948 to 1958. THE EXCHANGE, March 1958, p. 18. 
123 The question of adverse interest is important only in cases in which the stock-
holders have the power to effectuate a change through their vote. Therefore, the numerous 
cases holding that stockholders did not have the statutory or charter power to eliminate 
accruals are disregarded. Likewise, the cases in which the plaintiff lost because of some 
weakness on his part, such as !aches, are immaterial. This leaves for consideration the 
reported instances in which the majority had the power to eliminate accruals and the 
plaintiff was in a position to challenge the action and did so on the ground of unfairness 
or fraud. 
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The accrual problem may be solved by either a compulsory or 
an optional exchange of shares. The compulsory plan, which 
results in a total elimination of accruals, may be accomplished by 
a charter amendment or a merger, either of which will cancel the 
old shares and replace them with new ones.124 The optional tech-
nique calls for the issuance of new shares which "top" the old 
shares with dividend and other priorities. The intent is to make 
the old shares so unattractive for the future that the owner will 
accept the offer to exchange the old for the new. The result is 
the drastic diminution, if not the total elimination, of accruals. Of 
the two methods, and considering only the instances in which sta-
tutory power was present, the optional plan has received almost 
universal acceptance by the courts.125 This is not surprising. It 
is "voluntary" in the sense that the holders are at liberty to re-
tain their presently-owned preferred shares. On the other hand, 
corporations have had surprisingly good success with the com-
pulsory exchange of shares brought about by amendment126 or 
merger.127 
124 In Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. II5 (1936), an amendment 
canceling accruals was held invalid. But the same result was permitted in Havender v. 
Federal United Corp., 24 Del. Ch. 318, II A. (2d) 331 (1940) by merger. The inconsistency 
of this position is illuminated in Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., (3d Cir. 1943) 136 
F. (2d) 944. 
125 In the following instances plans for "topping" previously issued preferred shares 
were upheld: Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., (3d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 701 (Delaware 
corporation); Johnson v. Fuller, (3d Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 618 (Pennsylvania corporation); 
Ainsworth v. Southwestern Drug Corp., (5th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 172 (Texas corporation); 
Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. (2d) II, 85 P. (2d) 580 (1938) (Dela-
ware corporation); Shanik v. White Sewing Mach. Corp., (Del. 1941) 19 A. (2d) 831 (Dela-
ware corporation); Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (1923) 
(Delaware corporation); Kreiker v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 III. 364, 29 N.E. (2d) 502 (1940), 
affd. 312 U.S. 659 (1941) (Illinois corporation); Francke v. Axton-Fisher Tobacoo Co., 289 
Ky. 687, 160 S.W. (2d) 23 (1942) (Kentucky corporation); Johnson v. Lamprech, 133 Ohio 
St. 567, 15 N.E. (2d) 127 (1938) (Ohio corporation). 
In the following instance, a similar plan was enjoined: Buckley v. Cuban Am. Sugar 
Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 322, 19 A. (2d) 820 (1940). 
In Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., (D.C. R.I. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 533, creation 
of prior preferences by a Delaware corporation was approved, but elimination of a sinking 
fund was held invalid. 
126 In these cases amendments canceling accruals were held valid: McQuillen v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co., (4th Cir. 1940) II2 F. (2d) 877, cert. den. 3II U.S. 695 (1940) 
(Maryland corporation); Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 Ill. 260, 85 N.E. (2d) 722 
(1949) (Illinois corporation); Sherman v. Pepin Pickling Co., 230 Minn. 87, 41 N.W. (2d) 
571 (1950) (Minnesota corporation); Franzblau v. Capital Sec. Co., 2 N.J. Super. 517, 64 
A. (2d) 644 (1949) (New Jersey corporation); McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 
N.Y.S. (2d) 253 (1945) (New York corporation). 
In Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A. (2d) 200 (1943), affd. 134 
N.J. Eq. 359, 35 A. (2d) 894 (1944), a plan for cancellation was held unfair. 
121 In these cases mergers undertaken to cancel accruals were approved: Langfelder 
v. Universal Labs., (3d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 804 (Delaware corporations); Hottenstein 
v. York Ice Mach. Corp., (3d Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 944 (Delaware corporations): Hubbard 
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In the over-all picture, if the power to eliminate accruals is 
present, the method selected, whether optional or compulsory, 
does not make too much difference, provided certain other facts 
are present. The most important of these is business necessity. 
Practically all courts record the financial condition of the company. 
While the corporation need not be on the brink of bankruptcy,128 
a serious financial crisis helps justify the taking of expected ac-
cruals from the preferred. Any evidence indicating that the cor-
poration has been, is now, or is likely to be in trouble is useful in 
demonstrating the need for the plan.129 When a business is caught 
in the "whirlpool of the prevailing depression," and the directors 
are facing "probable bankruptcy and dissolution,"130 any reason-
able plan for saving the corporation, brightening the future, and 
salvaging the interests of the stockholders has an excellent chance 
of withstanding an attack by disgruntled stockholders.131 And 
if the recapitalization scheme has been worked out after consulta-
v. Jones 8: Laughlin Steel Corp., (W.D. Pa. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 432 (Pennsylvania corpora-
tions); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A. (2d) 148 (1943) (Delaware 
corporations); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, (Del. 1940) 11 A. (2d) 331 (Delaware 
corporations); Donohue v. Heuser, (Ky. App. 1951) 239 S.W. (2d) 238 (consolidation with 
another Kentucky corporation); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W. 
(2d) 341 (1949) (Delaware corporations); Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., IOI N.J. Eq. 
543, 138 A. 772 (1927), affd. 107 N.J. Eq. 528, 153 A. 402 (1931) (New Jersey corporations); 
Anderson v. International Minerals 8: Chem. Corp., 295 N.Y. 343, 67 N.E. (2d) 573 (1946) 
(consolidation of a New York and a Colorado corporation under New York laws); Anderson 
v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., (Ohio C.P. 1948) 87 N.E. (2d) 384 (Ohio corporations); 
Adams v. United States Distrib. Co., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E. (2d) 244 (1945) (Virginia corpo-
ration merged into Delaware corporation). 
In Craddock-Terry Co. v. Powell, 181 Va. 417, 25 S.E. (2d) 363 (1943), a Virginia 
corporation sold all assets to a new Virginia corporation. This eliminated accruals, but 
was held to be a liquidation of old company and entitled dissenting holder of preferred 
to the liquidation preferences provided in the charter. 
In Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 72, 67 A. 657 (1907), consolidation 
of two New Jersey corporations was enjoined as unfair. 
12s See, e.g., the following instances in which the plan was approved, and the corpo-
ration had a surplus at the time: Anderson v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., (Ohio C.P. 1948) 
87 N.E. (2d) 384; Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E. (2d) 127 (1938). 
129 In Sander v. Janssen Dairy Corp. (D.C. N.J. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 512, the court 
refused to halt a plan for recapitalization. One of the reasons was that management 
deposed that the future was not promising because of government regulation, price-fixing, 
and other contemplated burdens. Id. at 514. 
1so See Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. (2d) 11 at 18, 85 P. (2d) 
580 (1938). 
131 See, e.g., Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., (3d Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 944, in 
which a merger fabricated for the purpose of canceling accruals was upheld. In the 
opinion, Judge Biggs said, "As a practical matter we know that it is difficult to refinance 
corporate indebtedness when there are heavy arrearages of accumulated dividends out• 
standing. A corporation so situated reasonably may expect litigation and its concomitant 
miseries. Bankers are loath to float security issues under such circumstances." Id. at 952-
953. 
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tion with bankers,132 or underwriting experts,133 and if prominent 
businessmen testify as to its faimess,134 these are factors buttressing 
the plan. Contrariwise, if the corporation has a hopeful balance 
sheet, and the accruals are bothersome but not overwhelming, 
these are indicia of adverse interest and the plan is ripe for upset-
ting as unfair.135 
An element of obvious consequence in determining the fair-
ness of plans for elimination of accruals is the quid pro quo to be 
given the preferred in exchange for the accruals. The normal 
pattern is to exchange so many "old" preferred shares with ac-
cruals for so many "new" preferred shares. The ratios are tailor-
made to fit each existing situation, and no useful purpose would 
be served in attempting to examine the numerous variants. But 
it is interesting to observe that the offering of a "sweetener" or 
"kicker," in addition to the new preferred shares, seems to win the 
favor of the judiciary. The most glamorous persuader is the 
granting of voting power, sometimes even to the point of vesting 
control in the preferred.136 Realists viewing the publicly-held 
corporation might say that potential voting control in the publicly-
held corporation is a snare of delusive value, and that scattered, 
unorganized owners strike a poor bargain when they accept voting 
power as partial payment for dollars due in accruals. Be that as 
it may, transference of the potential control from the junior shares 
to the preferred makes more palatable the deprivation of accruals. 
In this country there continues to be a curious adherence to the 
idea that voting power in a large corporation is a power of real or 
132 See Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., 101 N.J. Eq. 543, 138 A. 772 (1927), affd. 107 
N.J. Eq. 538, 153 A. 402 (1931). 
133 See Hubbard v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., (W.D. Pa. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 432. 
134 See Donohue v. Heuser, (Ky. App. 1951) 239 S.W. (2d) 238. 
135 A good example was the attempt of Cuban American Sugar Co. to eliminate 
accruals through the voluntary exchange of new preferred for old. The arrearages were 
$3,984,767, but the earned surplus was $16,403,778. Current assets were $12,904,614, of 
which $3,697,000 was in cash and marketable securities. Current liabilities were $1,100,000. 
Buckley v. Cuban Am. Sugar Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 322, 19 A. (2d) 820 (1940). See also 
Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A. (2d) 200 (1943), affd. 134 N.J. Eq. 
359, 35 A. (2d) 894 (1944), in which the officers told stockholders the company was in 
"A-1 condition" and the books disclosed a surplus, a surplus which management denied 
because of confessed overvaluation of good will. The compulsory exchange of shares was 
ruled inequitable. 
136 See, e.g., Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., (3d Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 944; 
McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., (D.C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 639, affd. (4th Cir. 
1940) 112 F. (2d) 877, cert. den. 311 U.S. 695 (1940). 
In Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A. (2d) 148 (1943), the court 
said, "Complainant ignores the important fact that the old common stockholders have 
voting control, and that by the merger, control would pass to the holders of the old 
preferred stock." Id. at 134. 
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even monetary consequence. Other "sweeteners" catching the at-
tention of the courts are increases in dividend rates,137 cash pay-
ments,138 bonds,139 debentures,140 sinking fund provisions, pre-
emptive rights, and conversion privileges.141 All add an "extra" 
flavor to the new shares received in exchange for the original 
cumulative preferred and the appendage of accruals. 
The label of fairness is easier to come by if the proposal to 
eliminate the accruals has been openly conceived and honestly and 
completely presented to the stockholder-voters.142 In Barrett v. 
Denver Tramway Corp./43 the plaintiffs assailed the method of 
presenting the plan to the stockholders as part and parcel of their 
charge of unconscionable adverse interest. The complainants had 
a point. Company counsel had advised the directors that the 
charter must be amended before preferred dividends could be paid 
from current profits. Management repeated this information to 
the stockholders when asking for an affirmative vote on the amend-
ments. In truth, it was a nice legal question whether the amend-
ments were necessary. Perhaps Delaware law would have per-
mitted dividends from current net profits without the necessity 
of charter amendments. Fortunately for the proponents of the 
plan, the trial court found that no fraud, actual or constructive, 
had been practiced in the preparation and adoption of the plan, 
and that the legal effects had been fairly presented. The appel-
late court ended the matter by deciding that the record sustained 
the findings.144 The moral of this phase of Barrett is that those 
who would recapitalize must be very meticulous about what is 
said and the way it is said when soliciting the vote of stockholders. 
Those who attack on grounds of unfairness very properly and 
wisely ~eize each and every misstep as convincing evidence of 
oppress10n. 
137 See Franzblau v. Capital Sec. Co., 2 N.J. Super. 517, 64 A. (2d) 644 (1949). 
138 See Francke v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., 289 Ky. 687, 160 S.W. (2d) 23 (1942); 
Franzblau v. Capital Sec. Co., 2 N.J. Super. 517, 64 A. (2d) 644 (1949); Vulcan Corp. v. 
Westheimer &: Co., (Ohio App. 1938) 34 N.E. (2d) 278, app. dismissed 135 Ohio St. 136, 
19 N.E. (2d) 901 (1939). 
139 E.g., Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W. (2d) 341 (1949). 
140 E.g., Johnson v. Fuller, (E.D. Pa. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 744, affd. (3d Cir. 1941) 121 
F. (2d) 618. 
141E.g., Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A. (2d) 148 (1943). 
142 See McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., (D.C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 639 at 
646, affd. (4th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 877 (no conspiracy to deceive preferred); Porges v. 
Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127 at 130, 32 A. (2d) 148 (1943) (pertinent facts ade-
quately disclosed); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699 at 719, 39 N.W. (2d) 341 
(1949) (plan not secretly conceived nor hastily consummated). 
143 (3d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 701. 
144 Id. at 706. 
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In sum, management and counsel seeking a dissident-proof plan 
for the elimination or reduction of accruals on preferred shares 
would do well to give the shareholders the choice of retaining their 
present shares or being "topped" with a prior preferred. The ad-
vocates should pound hard on the business necessity for the move 
and the interest society has in the continuing prosperity of corpo-
rate business entities. The plan should be developed in consulta-
tion with experienced bankers and business experts. The quid 
pro quo for the old shares with accruals must be reasonable under 
the circumstances, and something "different" should be added 
because a higher dividend rate, a conversion privilege, a bit of 
cash, a debenture, or an increase in voting power will enhance the 
attractiveness of the plan. Lastly, the plan should be carefully, 
fully, and frankly explained to the stockholders. If all this is done, 
the dissident stockholder will have little chance of upsetting the 
plan on the ground of an unconscionable exertion of adverse 
interest. 
2. Advantageous Exchange of Shares 
Sometimes share exchanges are brought about by stockholder 
votes motivated by self-interests adverse to those of the holders 
whose shares are being exchanged. The technique may involve 
a charter amendment. More probably the merger process is fol-
lowed. Normally, there is no question of the statutory and charter 
power to accomplish the move, and the question is one of fairness. 
Some of the strong-arm power plays of prior decades seem 
flagrantly unfair by today's standards. One wonders how any 
majority group could hope to sustain a scheme whereby they pur-
chased the bonds of their solvent and promising corporation at an 
undisclosed discount, then proposed a merger with a wholly-owned 
subsidiary in which the bonds were to be traded for shares at ex-
change values fixed by the majority. In a classic understatement, 
the court suggested that there was a reasonable probability that 
the controlling stockholders were advancing their own interests 
at the expense of the minority.145 
Leaving the obvious, the question of invalidating adverse in-
terest becomes more difficult. When the new shares are to be dis-
tributed to the holders of both preferred and common, the ratio is 
important. There is a complex question of valuation. In working 
145 MacArthur v. Port of Havana Docks Co., (D.C. Me. 1917) 247 F. 984. 
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out an exchange formula, weight must be given the attributes of 
both the preferred and common, such as the proportionate owner-
ship of net assets, the dividend expectations, the preferences, and 
the voting powers. In addition to an equitable numerical distribu-
tion of shares among shareholders, the res given in exchange for 
the present shares must be substantially equivalent in kind to the 
thing surrendered. In other words, there must be fairness in both 
quantity and quality. 
The case of Outwater v. Public Serv. Corp.146 presents a wide 
range of problems on equivalencies. The plaintiffs held non-
redeemable, voting, preferred shares in a subsidiary which was to 
be merged into the parent. The dividends on the existing pre-
ferred were derived from rentals paid by the parent to the sub-
sidiary. The merger provided that, in return for their existing 
shares, plaintiffs were to receive cumulative, nonvoting preferred, 
redeemable after three years at the option of the issuer. The 
merger was legal in form, the plaintiffs did not contest the fairness 
of the exchange prices, the loss of voting power was held to be of 
no consequence, and the dividend yield was slightly higher. While 
the quantity equivalent was satisfied, the quality equivalent was 
not. The dividends of the existing preferred were prior to all 
other obligations of either parent or subsidiary, and payment was 
virtually guaranteed because of the lease rental obligation of the 
parent. After the merger, a large debt would precede dividend 
priorities. The most serious inequity was the lack of permanency 
accorded the new shares. They were redeemable at the option 
of the parent after three years. Thus the merger was nothing 
less than a forced sale to the majority at a price fixed by it and pay-
able at its pleasure.147 The merger was enjoined because it was 
oppressive. Availability of appraisal did not counteract the un-
fairness. 
Outwater v. Public Serv. Corp. stresses permanency of invest-
ment. Undoubtedly, the privilege of keeping funds invested in a 
going and profitable enterprise is an important element in the 
determination of fairness. However, the exigencies of business 
may offset the sanctity of permanency and justify the exchange of 
146103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 A. 729 (1928), affd. 104 N.J. Eq. 490, 146 A. 916 (1929). 
147 Id. at 466. 
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noncallable shares for redeemable ones.148 It may be that the 
dividend arrearages are so heavy that the noncallable feature is of 
no value.149 Or if the corporate charter is about to expire, and the 
charter is amended to extend life, there can be no complaint if the 
preferred is made callable. The preferred could have been ex-
tinguished by allowing the charter to expire.150 Absent such over-
powering reasons, the deprivation of permanency of investment 
signifies oppression. 
Over-all, the economic need of the corporation is the most 
potent factor in the determination of fairness in the exchange of 
shares.151 If the shift is necessary for continued existence, or even 
growth, if the distribution of the new shares is equitable, if the 
shares received are substantially equivalent in quantity and quality 
to the shares given up, then the plan probably will win the badge 
of fairness. If the exchange is engineered for the convenience or 
enrichment of the control faction, and there is no urgency, these 
facts are indicia of unconscionable adverse interest and the chances 
of a successful challenge are good. 
3. Shift of Assets from One Corporation to Another 
A parent corporation, a group of investors, or even an indi-
vidual may control two or more corporations. In such factual 
situations, it may be to the advantage of the controlling element 
to shift assets from one entity to the other. Innumerable are the 
ways of doing so,152 but the principal methods involving stock-
holder voting are consolidation,153 merger,154 sale or lease of all or 
part of the assets,155 dissolution,156 and contracts for services rati-
fied by the stockholders.157 
148 The exchange cannot be made by amendment unless there is statutory power to 
do so. See, e.g., Breslav v. New York & Queens Elec. Light & Power Co., 249 App. Div. 181, 
291 N.Y.S. 932 (1936), affd. 273 N.Y. 593, 7 N.E. (2d) 708 (1937); Yukon Mill & Grain Co. 
v. Vose, (Okla. 1949) 206 P. (2d) 206. 
149 Donohue v. Heuser, (Ky. App. 1951) 239 S.W. (2d) 238 at 243. 
150 Cowan Salt Lake Hardware Co., 118 Utah 300, 221 P. (2d) 625 (1950). 
151 E.g., MacFarlane v. North Am. Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172 at 181, 157 A. 396 
(1928) (corporation in such straits that it had nothing to lose by merger). 
152E.g., in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939), Standard, majority 
holder in Deep Roel<, caused Deep Roel< to enter into unprofitable refining leases, man-
agement contracts, and debt arrangements, all to the benefit of Standard. 
153 E.g., Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., (8th Cir. 1906) 144 F. 765. 
154E.g., Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 P. 1044 (1928). 
155 E.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921) (sale of all assets); 
Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., (W.D. Mich. 1883) 17 F. 48 (lease of all assets); Klopot v. 
Northrop, 131 Conn. 14, 37 A. (2d) 700 (1944) (sale of part of assets). 
156 E.g., Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., (7th Cir. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 369, cert. den. 316 
U.S. 675 (1942). 
157 Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., (6th Cir. 1915) 221 F. 529. 
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Two common characteristics are inherent in these cases. The 
first is that the control group will have a greater interest in the 
corporation receiving the alleged benefit than it will have in the 
corporation transferring its property. Therefore, if the control 
group does want to sacrifice one corporation, its loss in the trans-
feror corporation will be more than offset by its gain in the 
transferee corporation. For this reason, the mathematics of the 
situation gives an aura of righteousness to the complaint of the 
minority holder that his corporation is being damaged for the 
preferment of another corporation. The second characteristic is 
that the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction will 
rest on the control group. Not only does the dominant group have 
fiduciary obligations,158 but those controlling the vote are on 
both sides of the bargain, the usual presumption of validity ac-
corded majority action159 is gone, and the burden of proving fair-
ness is on those exercising common control.16O This gives the com-
plaining stockholder a significant advantage. He sets forth his 
allegations and the onus of proving fairness falls upon those 
engineering the transaction. 
Despite the burden of showing equitable treatment in a situa-
tion that is prima fade wrong, those in control do succeed in sus-
taining transactions in which one corporation allegedly benefits 
at the expense of another. Seldom is the result based solely upon 
the premise that when the legislature places power in the hands 
of the majority, such power is for the majority to use, oppression 
to the minority notwithstanding. The classic example of the 
philosophy of unbridled ruthlessness is the early twentieth cen-
tury case of Windmuller v. Standard Distilling & Distributing 
Co.161 Standard had guaranteed the preferred dividends of Spirits 
and when Standard decided to dissolve prosperous Spirits to get 
rid of the burdensome guaranty, the plaintiffs, holders of pre-
ferred in Spirits, sought to keep the majority from voting. The 
court replied that stockholders may vote as they please for the 
purpose of their own selfish interests.162 To the claim of inequity, 
158 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 at 308 (1939); Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 
483 (1919). 
159 "Where a majority of the stockholders ... speak for the corporation by taking 
action under appropriate statutory and charter provisions, a presumption of fairness arises 
in favor of such action." Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., (D.C. Del. 1944) 56 F. Supp 418 
at 422. See also Cole v. National Cash Credit Assn., 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931). 
100 Hyams v. Calumet &: Hecla Mining Co., (6th Cir. 1915) 221 F. 529; K.lopot v. 
Northrop, 131 Conn. 14, 37 A. (2d) 700 (1944). 
161 (C.C. N.J. 1902) 114 F. 491. 
162 Id. at 494. 
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the court employed the "wolf-trap" theory by saying that when the 
plaintiffs accepted their shares they knew that the laws of New 
Jersey permitted two-thirds in interest to put the corporation out 
of existence and that is what the majority was going to do.163 
There are no exact modern counterparts of Windmuller. But 
occasionally, when a court holds that the complaining shareholder 
has the right to appraisal, and no other right, the result and the 
language of the court may bring memories of Windmuller. In a 
controversy involving the interpretation of California statutes,164 
the plaintiff, owner of shares in Associated Oil, contended that a 
consolidation of Associated and Tidewater Oil was unfair because 
the shares he was offered were of less value than the shares to be 
surrendered. The majority shareholders in Associated had a large 
interest in Tidewater and would gain by sacrificing their interest 
in Associated to the advantage of Tidewater. The United States 
court of appeals stated that the pertinent California statutes say to 
a stockholder: 
"When you buy stock in a California corporation you are 
advised that your associate shareholders holding two-thirds 
of the shares may consolidate your corporation with another 
into a third corporation, offer you what they please of its 
shares in exchange for those you hold, and, if you do not 
like the offer, may buy out your shares at their fair market 
value at the time they vote the consolidation. . . . There is 
no underlying 'natural right' of a shareholder to follow his 
investment into a consolidated corporation."165 
The plea of fraud was of no avail. The plaintiff lost because the 
power to consolidate was absolute, save for the appraisal priv-
ilege.166 
Appraisal is not usually the exclusive remedy, and courts do 
consider the equities when fraud is alleged because the control 
group is sacrificing one corporation for the benefit of another. 
In sustaining the questioned action, a key factor in beating the 
challenge of a dissident is the adequacy in character and amount 
of the consideration passing from the allegedly favored corpora-
tion to the complainant's corporation. In sales and leases the price 
163 Id. at 495. 
164 Beechwood Sec. Corp. v. Associated Oil Co., (9th Cir. 1939) 104 F. (2d) 537. 
165 Id. at 540. 
166 The court recognized that under statutes of other states, appraisal would not be 
exclusive and the shareholder has the right to litigate the question of fraud. Ibid. 
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paid must be fair.167 If the amount received in a transfer is in-
adequate,168 even though it matches or exceeds that received at a 
judicially ordered public sale, the protestant will win.169 In 
mergers involving corporations under common control, the shares 
received in return for the old must be substantial equivalents.170 
There can be no forced exchange of a top-grade conservative in-
vestment for a speculative share.171 Nor can the dissidents' aliquot 
right to control be lessened by self-dealers. In contracts, the 
amount the plaintiff's organization is to pay must be consistent 
with current practices and the entire arrangement beneficial to 
the paying corporation.172 
While adequacy of consideration is of the essence in these 
cases in which the dominant group is both bargainer and bar-
gainee, courts pay heed to other aspects. Complete disclosure by 
management carries weight;173 so does approval by an outside 
governmental agency.174 Courts are understandably more solic-
itous about the welfare of unsophisticated and unsuspecting 
minorities than they are about the fortunes of experienced in-
vestors.175 The availability of appraisal tends to lessen the plain-
tiff's chance to upset a sale by the majority to its other corpora-
tion.176 
In sum, when assets are shifted from one corporation to an-
other, and a single unified interest controls both entities, the 
dissident claiming his corporation is being hurt for the benefit 
of another is in a strong position. This is so because the control 
167 Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 141 A. 425 (1928) (sale of all assets 
approved); Shaw v. Davis, 78 Md. 308, 28 A. 619 (1894) (lease upheld). 
168 See Citizens Sav. & Trust Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., (7th Cir. 1910) 182 F. 607 
(plaintiff seeking to cancel lease, demurrer overruled); Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., (W.D. 
Mich. 1883) 17 F. 48 (lease declared fraudulent); Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 
85 W. Va. 545, 102 S.E. 249 (1920). In Tierney the sale of all assets at a grossly low figure 
entitled plaintiff to money judgment based on actual value and not sale price. 
169 See Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921). 
110 E.g., Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262, 108 N.Y.S. 978, affd. mem. 
192 N.Y. 535, 84 N.E. llll (1908) (merger approved). 
171 Boyd v. New York & H. R. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1915) 220 F. 174 (merger enjoined). 
112 See Thurmond v. Paragon Colliery Co., 82 W. Va. 49, 95 S.E. 816 (1918) (commis-
sion contract upheld as fair). 
173 Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 141 A. 425 (1928) (sale approved); 
Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262, 108 N.Y.S. 978, affd. mem. 192 N.Y. 535, 
84 N.E. llll (1908) (merger approved). 
174 Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., note 170 supra. 
175 See Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 P. 1044 (1928). 
Two widows and a minor were the minority owners. Their lack of business knowledge was 
one of the reasons for granting them relief from the self-dealing of the majority. 
176 See Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66 at 86, 141 A. 425 (1928). 
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group is on both sides and the burden is on them to prove fairness. 
Further, if the control group has a larger interest in the enterprise 
dealing with the plaintiff's corporation, which is usually the case, 
there is an immediate suspicion that the control group is sacrific-
ing its smaller interest (and the plaintiff) for the aggrandizement 
of the larger. To offset this initial advantage which belongs to 
the ·unhappy stockholder, control groups seeking to exchange 
assets among their corporations must allocate the consideration 
with consummate care and skill, and they must do everything 
possible to avoid all indicia of adverse interest. 
4. Ridding the Corporation of Unwanted Stockholders - the 
"Freeze-Out" 
The motives causing the majority to seek riddance of minority 
holders are varied. The motives range from pure selfishness, as 
expressed by a spokesman for a majority who said it "griped them 
to see that the minority stockholders were enjoying any profit,"177 
to outright business necessity, as when the minority refuses to 
vote for continuance of existence.178 In between the extremes there 
are reasons of varying validity. Motivation may stem from the 
ubiquitous problems of taxation. If the majority owners are in 
the upper income tax brackets, they may wish to shed the cor-
porate form because of the double taxation of corporate profits. 
If the entity is a personal holding company, or is approaching that 
status, the problem of paying or avoiding the surtax may make 
it uneconomic to continue the existing arrangement.179 In addi-
tion to the worries of taxation, there are the burdens of manage-
ment. The fiduciary obligations placed upon those in control 
may impel toward elimination of the "beneficiaries," i.e., the 
minority holders. Some businessmen become weary of the re-
sponsibility of looking after other people's money. The majority 
faction may want freedom from the continuous annoyance of a 
cantankerous and troublesome minority owner. While riddance 
of the irritable co-owner may not be an absolutely legal reason for 
a freeze-out, it is a thoroughly understandable one. 
177 Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., (7th Cir. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 369 at 372, cert. den. 316 
U.S. 675 (1942). The speaker was Randall, vice-president and director of Inland Steel and 
Inland Steamship. Steel had voted to dissolve its 80% owned subsidiary. Steamship then 
purchased the assets and carried on the business. The minority received going-concern 
value for each share and not the value based on sale price of physical assets. 
178 E.g., Rossing v. State Bank, 181 Iowa 1013, 165 N.W. 254 (1917). 
179 See I.R.C., §§541-547 as to tax on undistributed personal holding company income. 
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Whatever the motive may be, the objective is the same - force 
out the minority and carry on the business, either in different cor-
porate guise or in an unincorporated form. In the freeze-out there 
is no intent on the part of the dominant group to quit or to sell 
out and place its money in a different venture. The intent is to 
get rid of the minority - to deprive them of their opportunity to 
stay with the enterprise. 
The dissentient has good cause for complaint. The case for 
the unwanted stockholder has been stated with fervor in a situa-
tion in which eastern investors purchased all but a few shares in 
a Washington state light company. The newcomers then voted 
to sell the assets to one of their number who in turn transferred 
the assets to a new corporation to carry on the same business in the 
same old way. Then dissolution of the original company was at-
tempted. The court would not countenance a maneuver so 
obviously intended to rid the corporation of an uncongenial minor-
ity stockholder.180 In holding for the minority the court said: 
"It is not enough to say that appellant received all his stock 
was worth. He embarked in this business, and had a right to 
stay in the business during the expressed life of the corpora-
tion. . . . The result of a successful practice such as is at-
tempted here will be that minority stockholders will always 
be at the mercy of the majority. If the enterprise fails, they 
bear their proportion of the losses. If, on the other hand, it 
succeeds, as soon as it passes the experimental stage, and the 
opportunity is presented to finally reap the reward of a 
judicious investment, they are coolly ejected from the corpo-
ration by a majority of the stockholders, who appropriate to 
themselves the accruing profits. In other words, they might 
be termed experimental dupes, who are subjected to the 
necessity of contributing to the losses, but denied the privilege 
of sharing the profits."181 
The ways and means of eliminating the unwanted stockholder 
are simply variants of the same theme - the sale of assets. Either 
there is a dissolution with a sale182 or a sale followed by a dissolu-
tion183 or a merger with the minority receiving redeemable shares 
180 Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23 at 30, 74 P. 1004 (1904). 
181 Id. at 30-31. 
182 E.g., Weisbecker v. Hosiery Patents, Inc., 356 Pa. 244, 51 A. (2d) 8ll (1947). 
183 E.g., Wall v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., (D.C. Mont. 1914) 216 F. 242. 
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in lieu of their noncallable securities.184 In any event, the assets 
of the original corporation end up in the hands of the majority or 
its alter ego, which is probably another corporation, and the 
business goes on as before. 
What are the aspects of the situation that help win a lawsuit 
when the plaintiff alleges a "freeze-out"? What are the indicia of 
adverse interest? The cases offer clues. Here again the plaintiff 
has an initial advantage because the majority holders are selling 
to themselves and the burden of proving fairness is on the majority. 
Further, there is a natural antipathy toward the strong who have 
the power to oppress the weak. Judge Lindley expressed the senti-
ment in Lebold v. Inland Steel Co.,185 when he wrote that legal 
power vested in the majority does not give a right to appropriate 
a business to the detriment of the minority, nor does statutory 
power provide "superior sanctity" nor the "attributes of tyr-
anny."1s6 
The motive, then, of the controlling stockholders in bringing 
about the merger, sale, or dissolution has an important bearing on 
the outcome of the cases.187 It is probable that almost all business 
deals are motivated by selfish reasons. Be that as it may, judges are 
human, and the degree of selfishness may well determine the 
court's reaction. If a transaction has all the earmarks of unbridled 
greed, then the majority is going to have a difficult time in sustain-
ing its actions against an oppressed minority. On the other hand, 
if the transaction reflects business acumen compatible with the 
customs and morals of the contemporary commercial community, 
then the court will be prone to go along. Various facets of the con-
troversy illumine the degree of selfishness characterizing the 
motive. 
The financial condition of the company is pertinent. The dis-
solution or sale of a prosperous business makes it appear that the 
sole purpose is to deprive the minority of its share of a thriving 
184 E.g., Matteson v. Ziebarth, (Wash. 1952) 242 P. (2d) 1025; Outwater v. Public 
Service Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 A. 729 (1928). 
185 (7th Cir. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 369, cert. den. 316 U.S. 675 (1942). 
186 Id. at 373. 
187 See Lattin, "Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Ma-
jority Stockholders,'' 30 MICH. L. REv. 645 at 649 (1932). 
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enterprise.188 Contra, merging or selling a failing business makes 
sense and provides a badge of good faith.189 
Along with the financial condition, the internal situation of the 
corporation is important. If there is discord, especially when the 
complainant has instigated and nurtured the discord, there is good 
reason for changing the existing pattern.190 And if the plaintiff is 
a blackmailer - if he has offered to trade his opposition for money 
- that fact works for management.191 
The conduct of the majority affords keen insights into the 
degree of selfishness motivating the control group. An open proc-
lamation that the sole interest of the majority is to force dis-
solution and go forward with the business without being "griped" 
at seeing the minority share in the profits does not endear the 
majority to a court of equity.192 When such a declaration is 
coupled with a disdainful and patronizing attitude toward those 
being frozen out,193 courts probably are more inclined to find that 
management is "faithless" to the company and to the minority.194 
Buying the assets through a straw-man does not win friends.195 
But full disclosure of all relevant facts does influence courts.196 
Out-and-out falsehoods are ruinous, and predictions of diminishing 
revenues and bad times ahead, calculated to secure votes for sale 
and dissolution,197 do not further the cause of those who would 
sustain the freeze-out. 
188 See Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919) 
(dissolution enjoined). Cf. Meyerhoff v. Bankers' Sec., Inc., 105 N.J. Eq. 76, 147 A. 105 
(1929) (unfair to deprive minority of opportunity to stay with prosperous business). 
189 E.g., Funderburk v. Magnolia Sugar Co-op., (La. App. 1942) 8 S. (2d) 374 (transfer 
of assets upheld). 
190 See Rossing v. State Bank, 181 Iowa 1013, 165 N.W. 254 (1917) (dissolution upheld). 
The plaintiff had blocked an effort to secure a nel'I charter and had organized a rival bank. 
191 In Matteson v. Ziebarth, (Wash. 1952) 242 P. (2d) 1025, the plaintiff blocked a 
plan to reorganize a failing business, then requested $4,000 for his vote on a subsequent 
plan. 
192 See Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., (7th Cir. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 369 at 372, cert. den. 316 
U.S. 675 (1942). In earlier litigation on this matter, Randall, vice-president of Inland 
Steel, majority owner of Inland Steamship, was quoted as saying "in his opinion, the Steel 
Company had been 'suckers' and had acted foolishly in permitting the minority to continue 
to participate in the profits." Lebold v. Inland S. S. Co., (7th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 351 at 
353. 
193 In Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., note 192 supra, management refused to "rehash" the 
reason for dissolution, and stated that they were not obligated to answer any questions 
about the parent company. Id. at 371-372. 
194 E.g., Nave-McCord Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, (8th Cir. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 383. 
195 E.g., Weisbecker v. Hosiery Patents, Inc., 356 Pa. 244, 51 A. (2d) 811 (1947). 
196 See, e.g., Matteson v. Ziebarth, (Wash. 1952) 242 P. (2d) 1025. 
197 See Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1886) 27 F. 625 at 627. 
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Of equal importance to motive in the freeze-out cases is the 
amount to be paid the minority. The majority is buying from 
itself, a situation permitted but not given the unmitigated blessing 
of the courts. Such sales are subject to close and rigorous 
scrutiny.198 Consequently, the value placed upon the minority 
shares must be above challenge. Obviously the challenge will be 
successful if the amount is grossly under the fair market price.199 
Likewise, a challenge will be sustained if the majority places one 
value on the assets for the purpose of buying out the minority, and 
then places a different and higher value on these same assets when 
listing them on the accounting statement of the successor corpora-
tion.200 The setting of values by management-appointed experts 
does not necessarily win the battle. Courts may believe that such 
experts are biased in favor of their employers.201 But someone must 
determine values, and outside engineers and professional appraisers 
are probably the best available sources. In contests over values, 
the majority may be well advised to offer to submit the matter to 
arbitration. Such an offer indicates good faith.202 
If the business is established and profitable, the worth of 
"going-concern value" and '~good will," if either or both are 
present, must be included in .determining the adequate price for 
minority interests. The importance of including going-concern 
value when computing the amount due the minority is shown in 
the two most famous freeze-out cases, Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. 
Co.203 and Lebold v. Inland Steel Co.204 In these cases, separated 
by half a century in time, the managements encountered identical 
difficulties on the question of values. The amounts offered the 
minorities were based on the prices the physical assets would bring 
upon a cessation of business. Yet the businesses were to be con-
tinued with those same assets and nothing was tendered the 
minority for going-concern value. In Ervin, the court said that 
198 May v. Midwest Ref. Co., (1st Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 431, cert. den. 314 U.S. 668 
(1941). 
199 Hinds v. Fishkill & Matteawan Equitable Gas Co., 96 App. Div. 14, 88 N.Y.S. 954 
(1904). 
200 Stebbins v. Michigan Wheelbarrow & Truck Co., (6th Cir. 1914) 212 F. 19. 
201 See Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1886) 27 F. 625 at 633. 
202 In Lebold v. Inland S.S. Co., (7th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 351, the court said that it 
would be more favorably impressed with protestations of good faith if the officers of the 
dominant company had shown a willingness to submit to arbitration the value of the 
shares of the minority. Id. at 355. 
203 (S.D. N.Y. 1886) 27 F. 625. 
204 (7th Cir. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 369, cert. den. 316 U.S. 675 (1942). 
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management could not adjust its interest on the basis of carrying 
on the business and at the same time insist that the interests of the 
minority be adjusted on the basis of a dissolution and an ending 
of the operations.205 In Lebold, the court held there was value 
over and above the physical assets, that such was obvious because 
a very prosperous business was still being conducted by the de-
fendants. Therefore, the minority was entitled to going-concern 
value.206 
Other courts, especially when dealing with mercantile estab-
lishments, have stressed that the worth of good will must be counted 
when the majority deprives the minority of the opportunity of 
continuing in the business.207 When a wholesale grocery business 
has had a successful operation for fifty years, with a current list of 
fifteen hundred loyal and regular customers, and carries on in the 
same way in the same place with only a slight change of name, good 
will has real value. The stockholder frozen out of such an enter-
prise has a just claim for compensation for a portion of that good 
wm.2os 
The giving of book value, which ordinarily is the aliquot 
portion of costs, plus additions and appreciations, less depreciation 
and obsolescence, is not an absolute indication of value. The 
shares of many corporations sell for less, many for more, than 
book value. A completely fair price based upon an inclusion of all 
aspects of value is an absolute must if the majority expects to pre-
vail against the complainants. 
Freeze-outs can be worked. The very nature of the move en-
genders suspicion and the term itself carries unpleasant and sinis-
ter connotations. Therefore, those who would rid a prosperous, 
or even a hopeful corporation of unwanted stockholders would do 
well to base their actions upon some acceptable business reason, 
be very frank and honest, and above all, lean over backwards to 
give the ousted holders an abundantly adequate price for their 
shares. 
C. Summary 
Specific areas of stockholder decisions reached through voting 
have now been examined. The study has centered on common 
205 27 F. 625 at 630. 
206 125 F. (2d) 369 at 374. 
201 Godley v. Crandall &: Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914). 
208 Nave-McCord Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, (8th Cir. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 383. 
998 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
factual situations, i.e., purchase and sale of assets, executive bene-
fits, elimination of accruals, share exchanges, shifting of assets, and 
freeze-outs. In these basic fact patterns certain allegations of undue 
adverse interest seem indigenous to the particular action. For 
example, in the purchase of assets from the corporation, the dom-
inant stockholder is universally accused of buying too low. If he 
sells to the corporation, the price is too high. In freeze-out situa-
tions, the typical complaint is that the majority is motivated by 
the completely selfish desire to deprive the minority of the oppor-
tunity to share in the future growth and prosperity of a very 
promising enterprise. In fact, in each of the shareholder actions 
enumerated it is probable that the attack of the dissenters will be 
based upon a predictable set of allegations. 
The effort herein has been to catalog the indicia giving rise 
to these allegations in each category of shareholder actions, there-
by enabling careful planners to avoid or defeat pleas of invalidity 
based upon charges of adverse interest. 
It is submitted that if management is to sustain a shareholder 
vote, there must be (I) a modicum of business reason stimulating 
the move, (2) openness of purpose and honesty of presentation, 
(3) motives compatible with prevailing business ethics and mores, 
and (4) fair exchange values. If any of these elements are lacking, 
the proposition is open for a successful challenge based upon the 
plea of unconscionable adverse interest, and the dissident has 
potent weapons available for the attack. 
